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Abstract
We study on how a larger local government budget on infrastructure does not refl ect into good quality of road in forty-one district/city across Indonesia given the fact of low infrastructure quality and low government spending on infrastructure. This 
study excels its preceded studies done by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) at country level. The 
methodology used is a combination of quantitative and qualitative approach since our main 
research query is to seek facts on why a larger government spending is not followed by bett er 
quality of infrastructure. Our empirical strategy proved that corruption has aﬀ ected government 
spending directly refl ecting cost of corruption has been included as infrastructure project cost. 
We argue that corruption does aﬀ ect quality of infrastructure negatively through government 
spending. Given the fact of Indonesian decentralization system enabling local election at district/
city level it gives more room for decision-making process that has never been conducted before 
under centralized system. Corruption tends to occur in situation where the monitoring eﬀ ort of 
central bureaucrat does exist while participation of local civil society is low. Although a district 
has already implemented e-procurement system intended to reduce opportunity of corruption 
incidence, it still exists through hidden-agreement between bureaucrat and such contractor who 
agree upon the project announcement process. They agree to set bid-price at lower level so that 
the contractor can win the project. This unfair process is suspected to happen since the budgetary 
process taking place at legislative where political bargaining is massive. 
22005 to Rp 2.1 quintillion in 2010 (World Bank, 2012). 
However, its percentage to total regional spending 
was increased from 2005 to 2009 only. While during 
2010 – 2011 the percentage of infrastructure spending 
was decreased from 15 percent to 13 percent (based 
on 2010 APBD Amendment and 2011 APBD Plan). 
The spending in infrastructure sector in percentage to 
total local government spending was increased only 
4 percent, i.e. from 18 percent in 2002 to 22 percent in 
2006 in Gorontalo Province (World Bank, 2008).
However, in the case of South Sulawesi Province, the 
increase of government budget was not followed by 
an increase in road infrastructure quality; about 37.6 
percent of respondent said that road quality in dis-
tricts/cities was bad in 2011, while only 26.6 percent 
of respondent felt the same situation in 2007 (KPPOD, 
2011). To improve condition of deteriorate roads in 
districts/cities of South Sulawesi it was required about 
131 days in 2011, while in 2007 the same condition of 
roads only required 42 days. Such contrary condition 
has urged a motivation to this study to examine what 
kinds of factors caused the situation.
In order to fi nd the answer, KPPOD has undertaken 
a simple correlation test regarding correlation be-
tween low qualities of roads with local government 
spending increase (Figure 1). The linear correlation 
line drawn from left -bott om side to right-top side 
shows a positive correlation between the two vari-
ables. Such result is a plot randomly made towards 
I. Background
The Government of Indonesia has made some 
development programs recently to improve conditions 
of physical infrastructure. One of the programs is 
MP3EI which contains, among others development of 
physical infrastructure at some corridors which are 
focused at economic growth centers such as North 
Sumatera for western side and South Sulawesi for 
eastern side. Such Government plan is defi nitely 
an important step to overcome the problem of low 
infrastructure quality in Indonesia, which position 
according to World Economic Forum (2010), is ranked 
76 out of 142 countries, whilst neighbor countries’ 
ranks such as Malaysia and Thailand are 26 and 42. 
A study result by KPPOD (2011) regarding business-
man perception in the regions shows that infrastruc-
ture has been the main obstacle in addition to the pro-
gram of private business sector development by local 
government, interaction between local government 
and businessman, and business licensing. In this case, 
infrastructure condition in Indonesia is currently 
worse and certainly needs a government comprehen-
sive and integrative program to improve. 
Such government plan is accompanied by an increase 
in spending on infrastructure sector. Government of 
South Sulawesi Province, for example, has increased 
riil spending in infrastructure sector, almost doubled 
between 2005 – 2010, i.e. from Rp 1 quintillion in 
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the 25 districts/cities in Indonesia, each of which has 
implemented Government Accounting System (SAP) 
in their APBD realization report. Based on such early 
fi nding, we develop a research query, i.e. ‘why a larger 
local government spending budget in infrastructure sector 
is not followed by a bett er quality of road infrastructure?’
Government spending on infrastructure sector is a 
public investment which could improve productivity 
on production factors which in turn would promote 
economic growth. For decision makers in private 
sector as well as in public sector, such government 
spending may become a sign which enabling a higher 
economic growth following implementation of infra-
structure improvement policy. However, some stud-
ies at national level have shown that public invest-
ment management is not necessarily successful in 
boosting economic development due to corruption 
factor; public investment has just been a cause for 
a decrease in economic productivity instead (Tanzi 
and Davoodi, 1997). In developing countries which 
have just experience democracy and relatively high 
economic growth, government budget management 
is very risky to corruption since political institutions 
have not been developing well (Huntington, 1968).
Indonesia which has been implementing regional 
autonomy system and fi scal decentralization for more 
than one decade has experienced a lot of corruption 
cases which involved Head of Local Government. In 
2010 there were 17 governors of totally 33 provinces 
and 138 regent/mayor became corruption suspects 
according to Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK)1). Such corruption cases in general are related to 
misuse of government budget for their own interests, 
in particular in provision of goods and services, 
which has been the most common corruption case in 
1). Kurniawan, Teguh, Democratic Decentralization and Corruption in Indonesia: Why Decentralization has Caused Head of 
Regions Aﬀ ected by Corruption Cases. Paper presented at International Conference on Decentralization and Democratization 
in South East Asia, University of Freiburg, Germany, June 16, 2011 
the regions, i.e. about 70% (KPK, 2011). Government 
spending at all districts/cities in Indonesia has 
been the prime mover for economic growth since 
private sector is relatively less developed. This 
local corruption has defi nitely given an impact to 
decreasing local economic performance. In contrary, 
fi ght against corruption could increase investment 
level about 2.9% of Bruto Domestic Product based on 
Business International Indices data for the period of 
1980 – 1983 in 70 countries (Mauro, 1995).
In this study we do research on the research query 
in district/city as analysis unit. Indonesia has been 
perceived as one of the countries having high 
corruption level, ranked 100 of 182 countries surveyed 
(Transparency International, 2011). By focusing on 
lower level of government, i.e. district/city level, it 
is expected that the study could fi nd characteristics 
of institutions at the government system which 
triggering corruption actions. Subsequently the study 
result would provide inputs to be considered in 
planning and supervision processes in infrastructure 
projects. 
Corruption Defi nition 
Theoretically, Klitgaard (1988) describes such 
condition where corruption occurs, i.e. at the absence 
of public accountability coupled with high level of 
market monopoly and high power of decision maker 
(discretionary). 
Corruption happens because there is a situation where 
monopoly level is high, and discretion of the leader is 
extensive. Combination of both may increase the risk, 
however if public accountability is good corruption 
4risk maybe decreased. Such situation is explained in 
the following diagram:
From Indonesia’s law perspective, corruption has 
been defi ned in Law Number 31, Year 1999 as has 
been changed to Law Number 20, Year 2001 regarding 
Eradication of Corruption Crimes. Based on the Law, 
corruption is divided into 30 kinds of corruption 
crimes. Articles in the Law explain in detail actions 
that could be condemned due to corruption practices. 
The thirty kinds of corruption crimes are grouped 
into seven categories, namely:
1. state’s fi nancial loss
2. bribery
3. tampering in position
4. exploitation
5. deceitful action
6. confl ict of interest in procurement process 
7. gratifi cation.
In a simpler defi nition, the World Bank defi nes cor-
ruption as a misuse of public services position for 
own as a misuse of public services position for own 
interest, and is apart from political corruption (such 
as illegal campaign donation, buying voters, and so 
on.). 
Based on the abovementioned reference, in their 
survey Transparency International Indonesia (TII) 
defi nes corruption as the use of public authority for 
own interest. The operational concepts of corruption 
used in the survey are as follows (TII Report 2010, 
part 1, p.16): 
a.) Bribery: an ction of giving money to government 
oﬃ  cial which is intended to get a special right 
or to speed up a bureaucracy process. 
b.) Tampering in position: an action to utilize 
government facility and state’s budget as well 
for private use.
c.) Exploitation: an action of asking for money to 
client by public oﬃ  cial in carrying out his/her 
service duty.
d.) Confl ict of interest in goods and services 
procurement process: direct or indirect 
involvement of public oﬃ  cial in goods and 
services procurement process to get profi t for 
himself/herself or his/her group.  
II. Review of the former Study
Corruption and Economic Productivity
Barro (1990) argued that infrastructure was a factor 
in production function, however, an investment 
in infrastructure sector might decrease investment 
in other sectors. The impact of such hypothesis 
is that public infrastructure which is fi nanced by 
the government has to consider investment made 
by private sector, therefore combination of both 
investments might create an optimum economic 
growth. If the government investment is very high, 
the private investment will be contraproductive 
due to investment capacity limitedness in boosting 
economic growth. The following discussion shows 
that it is not the competition between private and 
public which brings down economic productivity, 
rather, it is the management of public investment 
factor. 
Analysis at the state level shows that there is a 
positive correlation between government spending 
and corruption (SevUktekin et al., 2010). Composition 
of government spending itself has a certain impact to 
corruption incidence since public investment project 
creates opportunities for corruption to happen (ibid 
p.143). A study by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) also 
shows that a higher public investment is obviously 
not productive in creating economic productivity 
since corruption has been worsening performance 
of the investment. Such corruption is made by 
project executor who practices bribery, gives some 
commissions to public oﬃ  cial who has rendered him in 
winning the tender of physical infrastructure project. 
The commission money has certainly marked up total 
project cost, therefore it is as if government spending 
in infrastructure sector is increased. Implementation 
process of investment project involves some stages, 
bears the risks of corruptions to occur, due to decision 
making processes, uncertainties, and vested-interest 
in issues such as: project specifi cations and design, 
goods and services bidding, construction supervision 
bidding, project cost negotiations, tendering approval 
process and contract preparation.
A corruption occurrence will reduce construction 
project cost by at least 5-20 percent of the total 
project cost (Gulati and Rao, 2006). If investment and 
maintenance costs is corrupted by fi ve percent, it is 
predicted that state fi nance in developing countries 
would be burdened with a predicted amount 
reaching US 18 billion2). In addition, a study result 
by Rose-Ackermann (1996) shows that illegal costs 
could reduce quality of government projects, and 
increase spending budget about 30 to 50%. In case 
of developing countries, corrupted money is usually 
enjoyed by government and military oﬃ  cials who are 
the elites.
Corruption does not only cause losses of public sector 
productivity directly, but also reducing incentives 
for private sector to invest (Bardhan 1997, p.1327). 
Corruption could increase production costs, therefore 
decreasing income tax from public investment. In 
addition, corruption also increases prices so that 
corruption burden would be borne by consumers. 
Corruption result would be more enjoyable for 
corruptors for their own consumption rather than 
2)  According to an estimate of investment and maintenance, by Fay and Yepes, 2003
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for used in infrastructure produvtivity improvement. 
In such situation where rules and law are not clear 
and very complicated, there is a tendency that the 
contractor would aﬃ  liate with the state’s oﬃ  cial 
(Bigsten and Moene, 1996). Corruption cost would 
be used to smoothing infrastructure construction 
process and to provide incentive for bureaucrat to 
postpone public services so as to create rooms for 
negotiations which enabling corruption to occur. 
Such extensive corruption will certainly reduce 
government legitimation level because public oﬃ  cials 
should have been working based on prevailing rules.
According to Dellavalade (2006) corruption practice 
in government spending generally occurs by means 
of: a) a bureaucrat always tries to fi nd room for 
budget corruption for his/her own use, in particular 
at such budget item which is usually negotiable such 
as those in energy and defence sectors, and also in 
law projects to produce law and regulations; b) 
government projects which involve large amount of 
budget allocations.
A bureaucrat’s certain expectation in big amount 
of contract value has become an incentive for the 
contractor to bribe the bureaucrat. Corruption, on 
the other side, could increase eﬃ  ciency level where 
existing organization and rules are not eﬀ ective 
(Meon and Weill, 2008). They made an estimation 
of corruption clarifi er variable and corruption-
management quality interactive variable with 
clarifi ed variable as eﬃ  ciency level. The stuy used TI 
data and World Bank Governance Indicator at state’s 
analysis unit.
Corruption and Decentralization 
Decentralization may decrease or increase corruption 
practices. By implementing decentralization there 
is an improvement in local accountability by means 
of increased participation of society in public policy 
making (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983), and increase 
of local government respons to the peoples’ needs 
(Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1993). Decentralization may 
create multiple layers of control toward bureaucracy 
organization since there are more agents controlling 
the government’s ruling way (Carbonara, 1999). Higher 
discretion at regional level aft er implementation of 
decentralization has not been immediately increasing 
the risk of corruption occurrence. Such incidence 
depends on the superior’s or the higher level of 
government institutions’ controlling capabilities. 
Decentralization in principle creates a trade-oﬀ 
between incentive of the higher level of government 
institution to monitor and the hope of the lover level 
agent to bribe. A quantitative, empirical study by 
Fisman and Gatt i (2002) using country-level data 
fi nds that decentralization just brings down level of 
corruption. They made regression of decentralization, 
income level, population, and proportion of 
government spending to national GDP. 
On the other side, decentralization which is also 
part of democratization process (to make it easier) 
may boost corruption incidence since politician 
actors appear in numbers during political reform 
era. Politician actor appears in larger numbers due 
to such situation wherein socio-culture is extensive 
with traditional values (Huntington, 1968). Bardhan 
and Mookherjee (2000) argue that at local level there 
are more corruption incidences because interest 
groups cohesiveness is higher, or because proportion 
number of voters having quality public information 
is low. An interesting fi nding of a study (by Reinikka 
and Svensson, 2004) shows that corruption of public 
budget for school happened because the school oﬃ  cer 
tend to make use of his high bargaining position 
for infl uencing local government to allocate higher 
budget amount. Such political, active att itude was 
more benefi cial for the school side, individually rather 
than taking passive att itude, i.e. just accepting school 
budget allocation made by the local government. In 
this case, bargaining power was more dominant than 
current regulations due to lack of local mass media 
exposes to corruption cases where local elites were 
more dominant in decision making at regional level 
(Shah, 2006, p.19).
Decentralization tends to spring more corruptors 
at regional level since discretion power is higher 
at such level (Shleifer and Vishney, 1993). Control 
and supervision measures undertaken by central 
government will be easily ineﬀ ective at regions due to 
high opportunities to make collusion (Prud’homme, 
1995). In a comparison study involving some 
states with diﬀ erent number of decentralization 
levels, it is found that states with higher number of 
decentralization levels have higher risk of corruption 
practices (Treisman et al., 2008). The study was done 
in Uganda wherein six levels (tier) of government 
have caused higher government spending, i.e. 32 
percent higher than those at states which have only 
two level of government.
A negative correlation between government 
spending and corruption level has been proven 
by Fisman and Gatt i (1999). Their study result 
shows that decentralization at the expenditure side 
tends to be problematic except if it is followed by 
decentralization at the income side. Low power of 
local tax tends to urge corruption practices since local 
government becomes more aggressive to non-interest 
groups due to high burden on tax revenues. Actually, 
tax revenues potentials from non-interest groups are 
high, however, since they have special relationship 
with government oﬃ  cials they tend to pay taxes 
lower than they should be. This situation urges local 
bureaucrates to be ‘acrobatic’ in looking for new 
targets of tax payer, i.e. non-interest groups wherein 
the bureaucrat has an opportunity for bargaining on 
big amount of taxes; this means corruption practices 
are more possible to occur.
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This studi used a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative methods to answer the aforementioned 
research query, i.e. why a larger local government 
spending budget in infrastructure sector is not 
followed by a bett er quality of road infrastructure. 
In principle, quantitative method examines statistical 
correlation of corruption variable by controlling 
presence of other variables toward government 
spending in roads infrastructure and infrastructure 
quality. 
Based on the above study discussion, we develop 
hypothesa as follows: 
1. The higher the corruption level, the higher 
government spending in infrastructure sector, 
ceteris paribus.
2. The higher the corruption level, the lower the 
government income, ceteris paribus.
3. The higher the corruption level, the lower road 
infrastructure quality, ceteris paribus. 
4. Negative impacts of corruption on infrastructure 
occur through government spending in 
infrastructure, ceteris paribus.
Quantitative Method
This study used data from various institutions such 
as Statistics Central Body, Ministry of Finance, and 
KPPOD at 2007 and 2010 periods. To determine 
regions, consideration is made upon completeness 
of APBD data report at the Ministry of Finance in 
both periods, which resulting in 41 districts/cities in 
four provinces in Indonesia, i.e. East Nusa Tenggara, 
South Sulawesi, Aceh, and West Java. There were not 
so many regions used as analysis unit in this study 
since total numbers of regions applying Government 
Accounting Standard (SAP) are just greater in 2007 
compared to that of 2010.  
Variable descriptions used in this study are as follows: 
• GDRPCAP or GDRP per capita, is total value of 
goods and services produced in a certain region 
at applicable price divided by total population 
in the region. Data was obtained from BPS. Data 
of applicable price was normalized toward total 
population (million Rp/person) since estimated 
period used in this study was very short, i.e. 
only two points; therefore autocorrelation 
eﬀ ect could be assumed as very minimum.
     
• INDEKSKORUP is an index containing variables 
to assess perception regarding corruption 
practices by Head of local government. These 
variables are more focused on corruption 
practices done by Head of local government 
rather than those done by his/her subordinates. 
Nonetheless, we assume corruption by Head 
of local government is more systemic, and it 
aﬀ ects his/her subordinates to do corruptions, 
and not the other way3). This index is a result of 
a process on KPPOD Survey data on Regional 
Economic Management. The higher value of 
the index refl ects the higher level of corruption.
• INDEKSROADQUAL is a perception index 
regarding riil roads quality and improvement 
of such roads quality relative to their 
former condition. This index is a result of a 
process on KPPOD Survey data on Regional 
Economic Management. The higher value of 
the index refl ects the bett er quality of roads. 
• TOTREVGDRP is the ratio of total government 
income to GDRP based on applicable prices. It 
is assumed that infl ation impact of applicable 
prices utilization is none because utilization 
of government spending normalization 
and GDRP value are at the same period.
• ROADEXGDRP is the ratio of government 
spending in roads- irrigation- network to GDRP 
based on applicable prices. It is assumed that 
infl ation impact of applicable prices utilization is 
none because utilization of government spending 
normalization and GDRP value are at the same 
period. 
Table 1 below shows descriptive statistics of variables 
used in hypothesis test in this study. Data shown 
here are compilation data of 2007 and 2010 which 
are estimated by data panel. Average values of all the 
variables at the three models show the same value.
IV. Result and Discussion
Development of Road Infrastructure in Indonesia 
Indonesia is a state where investment still gives 
relatively low contribution to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). According to BPS, investment contribution in 
average is 22.56% for the period of 2004 to 2009, while 
consumption expenditure is still dominant in GDP 
structure of Indonesia, that is 55.45%. 
More specifi cly, investment in roads sector is very 
low, that is less than 2% of Indonesia’s GDP each year 
(Figure 3). A signifi cant decrease in roads investment 
happened in 1994 until 1999 when during the 
period investment declined by more than 50%. Such 
signifi cant decrease occurred when economic crisis 
happened in South East Asia including in Indonesia. 
Since Year 2000, investment in this sector tent to 
increase although there was a decrease in 2008. It was 
global economic crisis in 2008 which has caused roads 
investment in this year declined.
Road infrastructure investment in Indonesia is still 
dominated by public investment which is carried out 
by central, provincial, and districts/cities governments. 
3) Principal Agent Theory says that subordinate has just more possibility to create asymmetric information for his/her 
supervisor. Such situation enables the subordinate to do corruption rather than his/her supervisor.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
MODEL 1
Variable Mean SE Mean StDev Minimum  Median  Maximum
roadexgdrp 0.02085 0.00228 0.02067 0.00170 0.01451 0.09263
gdrpcap 10138329 647430 5862728 2472000 8874500 37553000
indekskorup 50.63 1.95 17.70 0.00 52.45 87.32
indeksroadqual 50.80 1.82 16.52 6.41 50.51 94.22
totrevgdrp 0.4140 0.0199 0.1799 0.0311 0.1487 1.0459
MODEL 2
indeksroadqual 50.80 1.82 16.52 6.41 50.51 94.22
indekskorup 50.63 1.95 17.70 0.00 52.45 87.32
roadexgdrp 0.02085 0.00228 0.02067 0.00170 0.01451 0.09263
MODEL 3
indeksroadqual 50.80 1.82 16.52 6.41 50.51 94.22
indekskorup 50.63 1.95 17.70 0.00 52.45 87.32
roadexgdrp 0.02085 0.00228 0.02067 0.00170 0.01451 0.09263
gdrpcap 10138329 647430 5862728 2472000 8874500 37553000
totrevgdrp 0.4140 0.0199 0.1799 0.0311 0.1487 1.0459
INTRCORR-ROADEX     2.569 0.173 1.570 0.000 2.438 8.091
Before implementation of regional autonomy, it was 
central government which dominated road investment 
in Indonesia with more than 60% of total roads 
investment contribution, while contributions by local 
government in provincial as well as in districts/cities 
levels were small. Moreover, private sector investment 
in this sector is insignifi cant. Since implementation of 
regional autonomy in Indonesia in Year 2001, local 
governments’ investment in roads sector has been 
increasing. Roads investment is now dominated by 
districts/cities with contribution reaching 60%. On 
the other hands, contribution in roads investment by 
central government has been decreasing. During Year 
2001 – 2009, there has been a great increase in roads 
investment by local government. However, during 
the period, there were not many changes in roads 
quality. The situation is shown in Figure 4 where 
proportion of roads with good quality was only 
35% - 40%. Moreover, roads in poor and damaged 
conditions tend to increase. Road infrastructure 
investment in Indonesia is still dominated by 
public investment which is carried out by central, 
provincial, and districts/cities governments. Before 
implementation of regional autonomy, it was central 
government which dominated road investment 
in Indonesia with more than 60% of total roads 
investment contribution, while contributions by local 
government in provincial as well as in districts/cities 
8levels were small. Moreover, private sector investment 
in this sector is insignifi cant. Since implementation of 
regional autonomy in Indonesia in Year 2001, local 
governments’ investment in roads sector has been 
increasing. Roads investment is now dominated by 
districts/cities with contribution reaching 60%. On 
the other hands, contribution in roads investment by 
central government has been decreasing.
There have been some possible reasons that causing 
local government’s increased investment has not 
been able to improve roads quality in districts/cities 
in Indonesia. First, roads investment was not used for 
roads maintenance and rehabilitation, instead, it was 
used for construction of new roads. The following 
fi gure represents a graphic of total roads in district/
city during Year 2001 – 2009. From this fi gure it can be 
seen that aft er regional autonomy era until now, total 
length of roads in districts/cities has been increased. 
The increase during such period was about 36%.
Second, total number of vehicles are increased. 
During the period (2001 – 2009), total number of 
vehicles increased more than 100%. Until now, 
motorcycle has been dominating motorized vehicle 
in Indonesia. The number of motorcycle is very high, 
that is more than 50 million. It is not only motorcycle, 
other transportation vehicles such as car, bus, and 
truck also have been increasing in number each year
Third, there have been corruption practices in 
procurement of goods and services in roads sector. 
Corruption practices in procurement of goods 
and services would be our study focus. To fi nd out 
corruption impact on quality of roads, this study will 
use estimation of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) panel 
data with random eﬀ ect. This is based on Haussman’s 
test result which recommends the use of such 
approach and reason of constant eﬀ ect of variables 
used in analysis unit4). To enable further analysis, a 
test of basic assumptions is made as follows.
4) Discussion on comparison between the three models of data panel in applicative way can be seen at htt p://www.stata.
com/support/faqs/statistics/xtreg-and-eﬀ ects/.
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Impact of Corruption on Roads on Roads Spending 
and Infrastructure Quality
Test on Basic Assumption of Estimation
To meet basic assumption for OLS Model (Ordinary 
Least Square), some tests on basic assumption of 
estimation were made. They are: 
1. Normality test to residual model; residual Model 
1 and 2 are not normally distributed (shown by 
signifi cant Jarque-Berra probability value). While 
result of the same test on two other models shows 
that Model 3 and 4 are distributed normally. 
Correction step can be made towards abnormal 
residuals such as variable transformation, 
however, this step is not eﬀ ective. Aft er we have 
made logarithma transformation (all variables 
become insignifi cant and coeﬃ  cient mark 
changed) to handle abnormality, it was found that 
the abnormality exists in TOTEVGDRP variable.
2. Homoskedastisitas and Autocorrelation Tests; 
Heteroskedastisity test is a test of varians’ 
similarity in inter analysis unit in data panel 
equation. In STATA program such test can be made 
by plott ing residual model, however this approach 
has limitation in visualization. Therefore, we 
made an identifi cation of heteroskedastisity 
problem by making an estimate to all the models. 
Result of the test shows that there are no problem 
of autocorrelation but the data have a problem of 
heteroskedastisity (Att achment 3). To overcome 
problem of data normality and heteroskedastisity, 
we made a correction of error standardization 
to the estimation coeﬃ  cient in STATA program 
for all the models using robust vce facility. This 
step could overcome heteroskedastisity problem 
at the model therefore all the models become 
homoskedastisity.
Empirical Result
Our studi follows Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) model 
to test our hypothesa by make a regression on local 
government spending ratio in infrastructure sector 
toward corruption index. In addition we added 
income per capita variable to control development 
level in a region which will infl uence the amount of 
local government infrastructure spending. The ratio 
of local government income to GDRP is also used to 
control local capability in fi nancing roads-irrigation-
network infrastructure projects. 
Model One 
Result of empirical test of Model 1 shows that higher 
corruption level tends to have an impact on higher 
local government spending in infrastructure sector 
(Table 2 of Equation 1 and 3). Although coeﬃ  cient 
value is small in equation 3, that is 0.00014 and in 
equation 1 is 0.0002052, however such result supports 
Hypothesis 1 with 95% confi dence limit. In equation 
2, corruption has no signifi cant impact to government 
spending. However, the regression coeﬃ  cient mark 
still indicates that an increase in corruption practices 
may increase local government spending in 41 
districts/cities in Indonesia. 
Result of empirical evidence in Model 1 (equation 1 
and 3) shows that corruption has signifi cant impact 
on government spending although Indonesia is a 
state with poor infrastructure condition coupled with 
relatively low infrastructure budget. Nevertheless, 
it appears that corruption has a direct impact to 
government spending. Corruption practices which 
tend to increase local government budget happen 
because contractors of infrastructure projects include 
costs of corruption (bribery) to local government 
oﬃ  cials into project cost estimates (marking up). In 
this case, project contractors take rational action by 
including corruption costs into project expenses. This 
happen because such cost is considered signifi cant 
in infl uencing production costs, rather than be 
assumed as gratifi cation. This empirical study result 
implies that corruption incidence is grand corruption 
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(involving large amount of money, rarely happen) 
since, for the contractor, such amount aﬀ ects its 
production function. This kind of corruption usually 
occurs due to weak design of the political institutions 
rather than just rent-seeking activities of local 
government oﬃ  cials.
The reasons for corruption actions to happen on local 
budget are weaknessess in controlling administration 
function of government bureaucracy from central 
to local level, and lack of active participation of 
local civil society in project procurement process 
in infrastructure sector. Apparatus at central law 
enforcement agencies are apparently proactive 
in their role, as they take necessary measures in 
following up people’s complaint regarding corruption 
cases, although following up people’s complaint is, in 
fact, part of their duties. From the qualitative study 
it was found that corruption practices occur at a 
condition where control from central government is 
relatively strong but participative control from local 
civil society is relatively weak. Increased role of other 
parties outside government agencies is needed since 
it is stated that:
“….SKPD focus is only on implementation of goods 
and services procurement (Presidential Decree No 80), 
however, it is less in controlling since all the time and 
energy have been exerted to carry out the goods and 
services procurement process, therefore it has an impact on 
poor quality condition….”
The qualitative study also found that condition 
enabling more corruption to occur is, in fact, a 
given condition (it is not due to policy factor). For 
example, if the number of local bidders which meet 
qualifi cation standard at announcement process of a 
local government project is limited, then a mechanism 
of project direct appointment is used. This condition 
enables corruption to occur because selection of 
Table 2. Corruption Impact on Government Spending
Dependent Variabel: Ratio Infrastructure Sector Spending to GDRP
Independent  Variable (1) (2) (3)
INDEKSKORUP 0.0002052 0.0000937 0.00014
(0.02) (0.265) (0.048)




C 0.0105848 0.03 -0.0004
(0.005) (0.000) (0.962)
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.1447 0.5333
Number of observation 82 82 82
Note: Figure in bracket is p-value
Source: Secondary data (processed)
bidders is oft en based on preference and knowledge 
of the local government oﬃ  cial. In addition, such 
condition of lack of local bidders oft en causes bidders 
of other regions be come in aft er given information 
directly from local government leaders. Certainly, 
information disclosure such as implemention of 
e-procurement, is a measure to reduce corruption 
practices, however, there are still rooms for corruption 
to occur since control system on infrastructure 
project implementation is weak. In a condition where 
e-procurement has been implemented, corruption 
incidence can still occur during bidding process of 
infrastructure project, in particular in deciding the 
design and area of infrastructure development. To 
explain such case clearly, we picked up some parts of 
an interview:
“...the process of budget allocation by local parliament is 
not diﬃ  cult. In general, local parliament will ask if the 
development project funding is huge and locus selection 
will be more strictly. During such process political nuance 
is very high, nevertheless so far there are always solutions 
to unite diﬀ erent opinions (fi nd win-win solution)…”. 
The abovementioned depth interview more or less 
confi rms what has been conveyed on literature study 
discussion that decentralization results in political 
bargaining is more possible to occur at local level 
rather than at national level. This situation creates an 
opportunity for corruption to occur since collusion 
is more easily made in local level wherein voter 
proportion which is not well-informed is greater than 
that which well-informed about public information. 
Model Two
At Model 2 we made a test of corruption impact on 
total local government income. The test was made 
considering that corruption occurs not only at 
expenditure side (government spending), but might 
also happen at government income side. In particular, 
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corruption at income side happens at tax revenues, 
retribution, and regional business revenues. 
The model test result shows that corruption does not 
aﬀ ect local government income. Such situation may 
happen since the character of government fi nancial 
audit at the income side is clearer rather than that at 
the expenditure side. 
Model Three 
At Model 3 (in Table 4) a test of direct infl uence of 
corruption on roads quality was made to prove 
Hypotheses 3. Empirical result shows that the 
particular hypotheses is proven at confi dence limit 
of 90% with coeﬃ  cient value of 0.167. If compared 
with coeﬃ  cient value of corruption direct impact 
on government spending in Model 1, coeﬃ  cient 
value of corruption variable is higher at Model 3. 
This means that corruption infl uence has a greater 
impact on worsening of roads infrastructure quality 
directly compared with that on government spending 
increase. At the same time, government spending in 
infrastructure sector has no signifi cant impat on roads 
quality improvement. This shows that government 
spending increase in infrastructure sector has no 
positive infl uence on roads-irrigation-network 
quality in 41 districts/cities across Indonesia. 
Local government budget which has less impact on 
roads infrastructure quality improvement could 
be caused by poor budget planning. A fi nding of 
the qualitative study shows that a collutive and 
manipulative process has been happening since 
planning process where e-procurement system has 
not been implemented in the particular region, as can 
be seen from a fi eld record as follows:
“ …during planning stage, there has been a manipulation 
when budget is determined, where majority Party in the 
Parliament, that is Golkar, oft en force their interest if 
there were a project with large amount of budget. At the 
goods and services procurement project, most portion of 
the budget is just for oﬃ  cial duty travel and not for goods 
Table 3.  Corruption Impact on Total Local Government Income 
Dependent Variable:  Ratio of Total Local Government Income to GDRP 







Adjusted R2 0.0131 0.1368
Number of observation 82 82
Note: Number in bracket is p-value
Source: Secondary data (processed)
and services; it turns out that it has an impact on reducing 
quality of the project result. Approach used to ‘force’ it is by 
conducting meetings for budget approval through voting 
mechanism. Due to large number of representative chairs 
owned, such a program with inaccurate budget proportion 
will always win”. 
Nonetheless, in fact other regions which have been 
implementing e-procurement system still have 
technical constraint during implementation. Technical 
constraint occurs such as LPSE staﬀ  are entrusted 
personnels from some SKPD. Such entrusted staﬀ s 
have not yet acquired required expertise to run the 
e-procurement system since the new system has 
just been implemented in year 2012, therefore there 
have not been any training for the responsible staﬀ . 
In addition, human resource quality also determines 
quality of tendering process as implied from the 
following interview:
“…..the dangerous spots for misuse of position/for 
problems in goods and services procurement may be in any 
stages of procurement, depends on human resource behind 
the position. For example, in planning stage, bidding 
participants and the tendering committ ee have made an 
early agreement that there would be profi t sharing, for 
example, taken from materials which quality would be 
reduced; while misuse in tendering process is less possible 
since it is now an electronic process. The general case is 
protests made by other bidder in relation with the tendering 
process in which he participates. Such protests could be on 
purpose or with hidden intention. In general, protesters are 
those bidders who lost at tendering process, and aft er being 
checked there are mistakes in administration stage and the 
mistakes are not the procurement committ ee’s fault…”
Corruption opportunities in roads infrastructure 
project may happen although a certain region has 
implemented e-procurement system. It may happen 
since there is an unwritt en agreement between project 
winner candidat with bureaucrat. Reducing technical 
specifi cation is the price paid for obtaining assurance 
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of winning the particular project. This commission 
amount tends to increase from year to year in 
infrastructure development project constructed 
by third party, therefore budget has no infl uence 
on roads quality improvement. The bureaucrat’s 
expectation to get profi t from infrastructure project 
for his own is refl ected from increasingly optimum 
government spending in following years in line with 
bribery capability of the project managers.
Model Four 
In Model 4 we use an interaction variable, that is 
an interaction variable between corruption and 
government spending in infrastructure sector. The 
model result shows that the interaction variable is 
proven signifi cant at 10% limit. Empirical result (Table 
4) of the interaction variable between corruption level 
– government spending proved that:
1. Corruption may result in roads quality decline, 
however, it depends on the amount of local 
government budget for infrastructure. The higher 
local government budget for infrastructure, the 
more severe impact the corruption will have on 
roads quality declining.  
2. In other words, in such a region where government 
spending on infrastructure is high, roads quality 
may be declined due to high corruption level 
occurrence in the particular region. 
A negative sign of the interaction shows that the 
higher government spending on roads, the higher the 
negative impact of corruption towards roads quality. 
In other words, the higher corruption level would 
reduce the productivity of roads spending.  
Government spending in infrastructure sector could 
improve infrastructure quality signifi cantly at 95% 
Table 4. Corruption Impact on Roads Quality 
Dependent Variable: Roads Quality
Independent  Variable Model 3 Model 4
INDEKSKORUP -0.16742 -0.073
(0.0618) (0.4852)










Adjusted R2 0.2083 0.26636
Number of observation 82 82
Note: Figure in bracket is p-value
Source: Secondary Data sekunder (processed)
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confi dence limit. If there is an increase in government 
spending in infrastructure sector to GDRP as much 
as one unit it will improve infrastructure quality 
as much as 278 point, ceteris paribus. Other result 
shows that, although it is not signifi cant corruption 
may reduce roads quality. Corruption infl uence 
towards roads quality decline is 0.073, it means that 
if corruption level is decreased by one point roads 
quality infrastructure will increase by 0.073, ceteris 
paribus. Corruption infl uence towards roads quality 
decline can be seen in Figure 7. 
Corruption could reduce roads quality although it 
is not statistically signifi cant. Corruption infl uence 
towards roads quality decline is 0.073. It means that 
a decline of one point in corruption practices will 
increase roads infrastructure quality by 0.073 ceteris 
paribus (as can be seen in Figure 7).
Corruption roles toward roads quality decline 
depends on local government infrastructure spending. 
At the case of region X roads infrastructure quality in 
villages are relatively poorer compared to main roads 
in capital city of the district since there are indications 
of corruption practices on roads aphalt caused by 
Village Head Election. This refl ects that where there 
are political processes at various government levels, 
such situation may open corruption opportunities. 
Political process in APBD discussion in both 
regions generally occurred almost identically, such 
as started from development planning process 
(Musrenbangkab) which apparently characterized 
as just a formality. Audience presence is just only 
as listener of government program presentation, 
thus not to be active involved in program planning 
process. In region X, although there has been online 
system of Musrenbang process, however, preference 
of the local parliament member (DPRD) toward his/
her constituent region has been more determining 
in decision making on infrastructure project design. 
This situation shows that the role of political process 
is high in making government budget corruption to 
occur. Although the process is in line with budget 
allocation and planning program resulted from 
Musrenbang, the majority party in DPRD has the 
power to make fi nal decision on infrastructure project 
program through mechanism of decision making by 
voting. 
V. Summary 
• Corruption has an impact on increasing local 
government spending in infrastructure sector. 
This fact indicates that the government project 
cost has been bubbled as source of corruption.
• Local government budget of 41 districts/cities 
accross Indonesia which was increased during 
the period of 2007 – 2010 did not have impact 
on improving quality of the infrastructure 
(roads- irrigation-network). Government budget 
may improve roads quality and it depends on 
corruption level which occurs in the particular 
region.
• In such situation where e-procurement has 
not been implemented, and control towards 
bureaucracy of higher level of government 
oﬃ  cials is not eﬀ ective, in order to reduce 
corruption level participation of civil society in 
controlling bidding process and implementation 
of local government infrastructure projects must 
be made eﬀ ective. 
• In case e-procurement has been implemented, 
corruption may occur through a conspiracy 
in bidding price between bidder and local 
government apparatus. The bidder will include 
such collusion cost into production cost. According 
to our qualitative observation in the fi eld, a region 
which has implemented e-procurement tends to 
have higher civil society participation than that 
which has not implemented e-procurement.
• From regression result on 41 districts/cities in 
Indonesia, corruption is proven to be able to 
increase government spending. Such result 
indicates that corruption in Indonesia happens in 
public expenditure budget. 
VI. Policy Implication 
• Control method on the process of government 
project bidding which involves experts outside 
government bureaucracy structure is needed to 
control corruption in project implementation 
process. Physical evaluation on fi nal materials 
of budget utilization should be done regularly 
and the results should be published to guarantee 
transparency. Local government may create an 
Adhoc Team consisting of experts from third 
party, non governmental agency.
• Increase active participation role of civil society 
organization in controlling infrastructure project 
planning and implementation of the project, in a 
more formal form, if a certain region has not yet 
implemented e-procurement.
• Audit process to government project by third 
party should be bett er carried out at project 
implementation process, controlling also when 
project is being implemented, and aft er end result 
to minimalized rooms for tricky actions which 
can lead to corruption.
• It is required to match the needs for expenditure 
with the income, such as for roads maintenance 
budget, it should be taken from revenues posts 
related to roads, such as tax on motor vehicles, 




Bardhan, Pranab and Mookherjee, Dilip. Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels. The American 
Economic Review, Vol.90, No.2, pp.135-139, May, 2000
Bigsten, A. and Moene, K. Growth and Rent Dissipation: The Case of Kenya. Journal of African Economies 5, 
p.177–198, 1996
Carbonara, Emanuela. Bureaucracy, Corruption, and Decentralization. University of Bologna, Department of 
Economics Working Paper No.342/33, Italy, 1999
Dellavalade, Clara. Corruption and Distribution of Public Spending in Developing Countries. Journal of 
Economics and Finance, Vol 30, No.2, Summer, 2006
Fay, M. and Yepes, T. Investing in infrastructure: what is needed from 2000 to 2010? World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 3102, Washington DC, 2003
Huntington, Samuel. P. Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale University Press. 1968
Kenny, Charles. Measuring Corruption in Infrastructure: Evidence from Transition and Developing Countries. 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3, 314–332, March 2009
Kurniawan, Teguh. Democratic Decentralization and Corruption in Indonesia: Why Decentralization has 
Caused Head of Regions Aﬀ ected by Corruption Cases. Paper presented at Conference on Decentralization 
and Democratization in Southeast Asia, University of Freiburg, Germany, June 16, 2011
KPPOD. Profi l Tata Kelola Ekonomi Daerah Sulawesi Selatan2011. Laporan Penelitian. 2012
KPPOD. Tata Kelola Ekonomi Daerah 2011: Survei Pelaku Usaha di 245 Kabupaten/Kota di Indonesia. Laporan 
Penelitian. 2011
Méon, Pierre-Guillaume and Weill, Laurent. Is Corruption an Eﬃ  cient Grease? Bank of Finland (BOFIT) 
Discussion Paper No.20, 2008
Prud’homme, Remy. On the Dangers of Decentralization. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1252, 
Washington DC, 1994
Reinikka, Ritva and Svensson, Jacob. Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government Transfer Program 
in Uganda. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, 2004
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. Democracy and Grand Corruption. Altruism, Nonprofi ts and Economic Theory. 
Journal of Economic Literature 34:701-728, 1996
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge 
University Press. 1999
Shah, Anwar. Corruption and Decentralized Public Governance. World Bank Working Paper Series 3824, 
January, 2006
SevÜktekin, Mustafa and Nargelecekenler, Mehmet. A Cross-Country Comparison of Corruption and Public 
Expenditures: A Panel Data Approach. International Journal of Public Administration,33:140-150, 2010 
Shleifer, Andrei and Vishney, Robert W. Corruption. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No.3, pp. 
599-617August, 1993
Tanzi, V and H. Davoodi. Corruption, Public Investment and Growth. International Monetary Fund Working 
Paper 97/139. 1997
Transparency International Indonesia. Indonesia Corruption Perception Index Report 2010, TII, Jakarta, 2010 
World Bank. Analisis Keuangan Publik Provinsi Sulawesi Selatan 2012: Meningkatkan Kualitas Pelayanan 
Publik dan Pengelolaan Keuangan Daerah di Gerbang Indonesia Timur. Edisi Workshop. 2012
□□□
15
Infrastructure Quality, Local Government Spending, and Corruption
Att achment 1 
Names of selected Provinces and Districts/Cities used 
as samples for this study:
Prov. of East Nusa Tenggara: 
• Lembata District
• South Timor Tengah District 
• Kupang City
• Rote Ndao District
• Manggarai Barat District











• Tana Toraja District
• Wajo District



















Prov. of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam:
• West Aceh District 
• Aceh Besar District
• South Aceh District 
• Aceh Singkil District
• North Aceh  District 
• Sabang City
Att achment 2 
Result of Residual Nomality Test 
□□□
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Att achment 3 
Result of Heteroskedastisity Test 
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